is not a bar. The maxim of "unclean hands" applies only when the wrongdoing has some association with the right on which the complainant depends. See 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JUR., 3 ed., § 399; 25 HARV. L. REV. 481. The furthest the courts have gone is to disqualify a complainant in case there is deceit associated with the trade name or mark. *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 108 U. S. 218; *Worden* v. *Cal. Fig Syrup Co*, 187 U. S. 516. The principal case arose in the federal courts. Now, being a foreign corporation, the defendant had the right to its name regardless of its Missouri business. And the federal courts conceive that the right of property in a trade name is incapable of being curtailed or limited territorially by statutes like that in the principal case. *U. S. Light & Heating Co. of Maine* v. *U. S. Light & Heating Co. of New York*, 181 Fed. 182. See *Consolidated Ice Co.* v. *Hygeia Co.*, 151 Fed. 10, 11. Even if the violation of the statute were by its terms to exclude corporations from state courts, the federal tribunals would still be left open to them, since the penal part of a statute does not apply to the federal courts. *New York Breweries Co.* v. *Johnson*, 171 Fed. 582. See *U. S. Light & Heating Co.* v. *U. S. Light & Heating Co.*, *supra*, 186.

WAR — CONFISCATION OF NEUTRAL SHIPS FOR CARRYING CONTRABAND CARGOES — CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. — A Swedish vessel carrying a full cargo of conditional contraband to a German port was captured by a British man-of-war. There was no evidence that the owner of the ship knew of the character of the cargo. *Held*, that the ship is subject to condemnation. *The Hakan*, [1916] P. 266.

A Danish ship carrying a full cargo of conditional contraband between two neutral ports was captured by a British man-of-war. There was evidence that this carriage was part of a continuous voyage which was to end in German territory. There was a dispute as to whether the shipowner knew of the ultimate destination of the cargo. *Held*, that the ship is subject to condemnation. *The Maricaibo*, [1916] P. 266, 286.

For a discussion of these cases, see NOTES, p. 497.

WITNESSES — COMPETENCY IN GENERAL — EFFECT IN CRIMINAL TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURTS OF FORMER CONVICTION OF CRIME IN STATE COURTS. — In a criminal trial in a federal court in New York, a witness was offered, who at the age of eighteen had been convicted of forgery in a New York state court and had been given an indeterminate sentence at a reformatory. *Held*, that he was a competent witness. *Rosen* v. *United States*, 56 N. Y. L. J. 771 (C. C. A., 2nd Circ.).

The court rests its decision on a supposed distinction between reform and punishment. In criminal trials in the federal courts, the competency of witnesses is determined by the law of the state as it was at the time of the Judicature Act of 1789, or at the time the state was admitted to the Union. *United States* v. *Reid*, 12 How. (U. S.) 361; *Logan* v. *United States*, 144 U. S. 263; *Maxey* v. *United States*, 207 Fed. 327. In the absence of state decisions of that time, the common law controls, according to which conviction of forgery brings infamy. *Rex* v. *Davis*, 5 Mod. 75. *Cf. Poage* v. *State*, 3 Ohio St. 229. Therefore a subsequent substitution of reform for punishment is immaterial. Further, it is well settled that it is the infamous nature of the crime and not the character of the punishment which determines the qualification of a witness. *People* v. *Park*, 41 N. Y. 21; *The King* v. *Priddle*, 1 Leach C. C., 4 ed., 442. See *Bartholomew* v. *People*, 104 Ill. 601, 607. See also GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, 15 ed., § 372, n. 1. However, the result might be supported on another ground. A witness is ordinarily disqualified only in the jurisdiction where he was convicted. *Commonwealth* v. *Green*, 17 Mass. 514; *Sims* v. *Sims*, 75 N. Y. 466. *Contra*, *State* v. *Candler*, 3 Hawks (N. C.) 393. See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 7 ed., § 92; 21 HARV. L. REV. 547. Since the state and federal courts